Can Labour Market Institutions Explain Unemployment Rates in New EU Member States?. CEPS ENEPRI Working Papers No. 27, 1 July 2004 by Ederveen, Sjef & Thissen, Laura.
Place du Congrès 1 • B-1000 Brussels • Tel: (32.2) 229.39.11 • Fax: (32.2) 219.41.51 • VAT: BE 424.123.986 
e-mail: info@enepri.org • website: http://www.enepri.org 
EUROPEAN NETWORK OF 
ECONOMIC POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTES 
WORKING PAPER NO. 27/JUNE 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CAN LABOUR MARKET INSTITUTIONS 
EXPLAIN UNEMPLOYMENT RATES 
IN NEW EU MEMBER STATES? 
 
 
SJEF EDERVEEN 
AND 
LAURA THISSEN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISBN 92-9079-504-2 
 AVAILABLE FOR FREE DOWNLOADING FROM THE ENEPRI WEBSITE (HTTP://WWW.ENEPRI.ORG) 
AND THE CEPS WEBSITE (WWW.CEPS.BE)  
© COPYRIGHT 2004, SJEF EDERVEEN AND LAURA THISSEN  
Can Labour Market Institutions Explain 
Unemployment Rates in New EU Member States? 
ENEPRI Working Paper No. 27/June 2004 
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* 
Abstract 
This study poses the question about whether labour market institutions can explain unemployment 
rates in the ten new European Union member states. In five out of the ten new member states, 
unemployment rates lie above the average in the 15 member states of the European Union (EU-15) 
that comprised the EU prior to May 2004. The study finds that labour market institutions in the 
acceding countries are less rigid than in the EU-15. Moreover, labour market institutions explain only 
a minor part of unemployment in the new EU member states. This does not mean that these countries 
have no labour market problems. Just as in the EU-15, a great deal of heterogeneity exists among the 
acceding countries. In some of them, labour market reforms could prove a key issue in improving 
employment performance. The main worry is the poor labour market performance in Poland and the 
Slovak Republic, where unemployment has risen to almost 20%. The main reasons for this growth are 
i) postponed restructuring in combination with tight monetary policy; ii) poor governance; and iii) an 
increasing labour force. 
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Preface 
We are on the verge of a historic moment: on 1 May, the European Union will be enlarged with eight 
Central or Eastern European countries and two southern European islands. Most of these new member 
states share a history as centrally planned economies with rigid labour market institutions. 
Unemployment is perceived to be high among these countries. 
This paper studies the relationship between labour market institutions and unemployment in the new 
EU member states. In particular, it describes the labour market institutions in the new member states 
and compares them to what is usual in the EU-15. Furthermore, it reviews both the theoretical and 
empirical literature on the effects that labour market institutions have on unemployment and adds to 
this literature by assessing the relevance of these mechanisms in explaining unemployment in the four 
largest new member states. In addition, it elaborates on possible alternative causes of unemployment 
in Poland and the Slovak Republic. 
The research was conducted by Sjef Ederveen and Laura Thissen, and funded under the European 
Commissions’ 5th Framework programme in the ACCESSLAB project. The authors benefited from 
discussions and comments by Michèle Belot, Albert van der Horst, Arjan Lejour, Michiel van 
Leuvensteijn, Ruud de Mooij and Paul Tang.  
 
F.J.H. Don 
Director, CPB 
April 2004 | ii 
Summary 
In May 2004, eight Central and Eastern European countries and two southern European islands joined 
the 15 members of the European Union (EU-15). Fifteen years ago, when most of these countries were 
under a communist regime, their labour markets were fairly rigid. Many people in the EU-15 therefore 
worry about the possible consequences of the new situation. Although labour markets in the EU-15 are 
often blamed for their inflexibility, acting as an impediment to economic development, the rigid 
systems in the former communist countries would certainly be no better, so the story goes. High 
unemployment in Poland and the Slovak Republic supports this idea.  
But are the labour markets in the new EU member states more rigid than those in the 15 member states 
of the EU? The general economic view, based on research with OECD countries, suggests that labour 
market institutions determine the rigidity of a labour market (Nickell et al., 2003). Since flexible 
labour markets are better equipped to respond to changes in labour supply and demand, unemployment 
rates are lower in flexible labour markets.  
Nowadays, unemployment is above the EU-15-average in five out of ten new EU member states. 
According to the literature, this may be caused by differences in their labour market institutions. 
Indeed, in the European Commission’s (EC) Recommendations on the update of the Broad Guidelines 
of the Economic Policies of the Member States and the Community for 2003-2005, published in April 
2004, the Commission advises the new member states to reform their labour market institutions: to 
lower their tax wedge, remove disincentives in the benefit system and increase spending on active 
labour market policies (see European Commission, 2004). Remarkably, the Commission makes little 
distinction between countries with low or high unemployment rates, although the differences are large 
– Hungary has an unemployment rate of 6%, whereas unemployment in Poland reaches almost 20%.  
Are labour market institutions indeed behind high unemployment rates in some of the new EU 
member states or are other factors causing high unemployment? After the transition to a market 
economy began in post-communist countries, labour market institutions have been revised drastically: 
unemployment benefits have been cut, labour market regulation has been moderated and all countries 
have moved away from the centralised bargaining system.  
Our study concludes that labour market institutions in the new member states do not on average differ 
that much anymore from the institutions in the EU-15. If anything, they should be considered more 
flexible:  
•  Replacement rates are lower and the duration of benefits is shorter – after one year of 
unemployment no unemployment benefit is issued anymore in three of the four largest acceding 
countries. 
•  In the wage-setting process, coordination is lower in the new member states. In general, bargaining 
takes place at the firm level. 
•  Employment protection legislation is less strict – only collective dismissal legislation is stricter in 
the new member states than in most EU-15 countries. 
•  Minimum wages as a percentage of average wages are lower in the new member states. 
Only expenditure on active labour market policies is considerably lower than in the EU-15. This 
implies that unemployment rates should not be higher in the new acceding states than in EU-15 
countries with similar labour markets. Apparently, other factors are behind high unemployment rates 
in new member states. 
This is confirmed by our empirical analysis. We extend the existing empirical work to understand 
whether the variation in labour market institutions can explain the different unemployment figures of 
the four largest acceding countries. The results provide some support for the theoretical predictions on 
the impact of labour market institutions on unemployment. Yet labour market institutions can explain 
only a minor part of labour market performance in the new member states. They cannot explain the 
diverging trend since 1998. Since then, unemployment has been rising in Poland and the Slovak SUMMARY | iii 
 
Republic towards 20%, whereas in Hungary and the Czech Republic, unemployment remained stable. 
These developments suggest that other factors are responsible for unemployment. 
Can labour market institutions explain high unemployment rates in the new EU member states? The 
answer is no. This does not mean that there are no labour market problems in the new member states. 
Just as in the EU-15, a great deal of heterogeneity exists among the acceding countries. In some of 
them, labour market reforms could prove a key issue in improving employment performance. The 
most notable example is Hungary, where a high tax wedge poses problems.  
Nevertheless, the main worry with respect to labour market performance is presented by Poland and 
the Slovak Republic, representing more than half of the population in the new member states. An 
important role is played by (postponed) restructuring. Both countries enforced major social reforms 
after 1998 to tackle economic imbalances. When combined with a strict monetary policy, escalating 
unemployment resulted. Another factor is the relatively low amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
these countries attracted during 1990-2000. A plausible explanation for this lagging performance is the 
weak regulatory quality along with the relatively unstable political and economic situation in both 
countries. A final factor behind the increasing unemployment rates is provided by demographic 
changes: the population in both Poland and the Slovak Republic has been growing modestly in the past 
15 years, whereas population has been declining in Hungary and the Czech Republic. 
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Can Labour Market Institutions Explain 
Unemployment Rates in New EU Member States? 
ENEPRI Working Paper No. 27/June 2004 
Sjef Ederveen and Laura Thissen
* 
1. Introduction 
In May 2004, eight Central or Eastern European countries and two southern European islands joined 
the 15 members of the European Union (EU-15).
1 Under the centrally planned systems most of these 
countries were subject to, their labour market institutions were rigid: employees enjoyed a high degree 
of employment protection legislation and pay systems were fairly rigid (Nesporova, 2002). Last April, 
the European Commission (EC) published its Recommendations on the update of the Broad 
Guidelines of the Economic Policies of the Member States and the Community for 2003-2005 
(European Commission, 2004). In the recommendations per country, the EC makes remarkably little 
distinction between countries with high or low unemployment, even though differences are large: 
Hungary has an unemployment rate of 6%, whereas unemployment in Poland reaches almost 20%. 
The Commission advises the new member states to lower their tax wedge, remove disincentives in the 
benefit system and increase spending on active labour market policies – in other words, reform their 
labour market institutions in order to address poor labour market performance. 
This report aims at answering the question of whether or not labour market institutions can explain the 
large differences in unemployment rates in the new member states. Can unemployment in new 
member states be explained by the rigidity of their labour markets or are other factors behind high 
unemployment rates in some of them?  
The Commission’s advice is consistent with the general economic view, based on research with 
OECD countries, suggesting that labour market institutions determine the rigidity of a labour market 
(Nickell et al., 2003). Since flexible labour markets are better equipped to respond to changes in 
labour supply and demand, unemployment rates are lower in flexible labour markets. Unemployment 
in the new member states is perceived to be high. Combining this with their history of rigid labour 
markets, it is reasonable to expect that a similar relationship between rigid labour markets and poor 
labour market performance holds for the new member states as well. If so, a solution is easily found: 
the new member states with high unemployment rates need to reform their labour market institutions 
and unemployment will decline as a result.  
The EU-15 countries are known to have more rigid labour markets than the US. Are labour markets in 
the new member states more rigid than those in the EU-15? After the transition to a market economy 
began in post-communist countries, the social security system has been revised drastically, labour 
market regulation has been moderated and all countries have moved away from the centralised 
bargaining system. After all these reforms, where do the new member states position themselves in the 
rigidity ranking now? And, if labour market institutions do not provide an answer, what does cause 
unemployment to be almost 20% in Poland and the Slovak Republic? 
Section 2 gives an introduction about the ten new member states, addressing labour market 
performance in these countries. Section 3 outlines theoretical relationships between labour market 
institutions and unemployment. Section 4 describes labour market institutions in the new member 
states and discusses the rigidity of their labour markets. Section 5 empirically examines the impact of 
                                                                          
* Sjef Ederveen and Laura Thissen are with CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis. 
1 In this report, the 15 countries that were already members of the European Union are referred to as EU-15, 
whereas the ten countries that joined on 1 May 2004 are referred to as ‘new member states’, ‘acceding countries’ 
or ACC-10. 2 | EDERVEEN & THISSEN 
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labour market institutions on performance. Section 6 suggests other causes of unemployment and 
section 7 concludes.  
2.  New member states: An introduction 
In May 2004, the European Union was joined by eight Central or Eastern European Countries (Poland, 
Hungary, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia and the Baltic states) and two southern 
European islands (Malta and Greek Cyprus). In 2007, Romania and Bulgaria will probably join. Even 
though most of the new member states share a history as centrally planned economies, large 
differences in unemployment have evolved over the past 15 years. Before focussing on labour market 
institutions, we first provide a concise overview on the social and the economic situation in these 
countries these days and the differences among them.   
2.1 Population 
The total population of the new member states equals one-fifth of the total population of the EU-15. 
This means that 16% of the total population of the enlarged Union lives in a Central or Eastern 
European country (see Figure 1). By far the largest country joining is Poland, with 38 million 
inhabitants. About 10 million Hungarians and 10 million Czechs will join (Table 1). GDP as a 
percentage of total GDP in the EU-25 is far from proportional to the amount the population takes up: 
only 5% of total GDP can be attributed to new member states.  
Figure 1. Population as a percentage of the total population of the EU-25(2001)(left) and GDP as a 
percentage of total EU-15 GDP(2002) (right) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Population in the new member states(2001), in millions 
Poland 38.2  Lithuania  3.5 
Hungary 10.2 Latvia  2.4 
Czech Republic  10.2  Cyprus   0.8 
Slovak Republic  5.4  Malta  0.4 
Slovenia 2.0  Bulgaria  7.9 
Estonia 1.4 Romania 21.9 
Source: Eurostat. 
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2.2  Productivity and wages 
At the beginning of the transition, labour markets in the acceding countries were characterised by full 
employment. Unemployment did not exist. Overstaffing and labour hoarding were common and gave 
rise to low productivity, and thus low wages. Figure 2 gives an overall impression of economic 
activity per person employed in 1995 and 2001, in relation to the EU-15 average. GDP is given in 
purchasing power parities. Although productivity has been rising between 1995 and 2001 in the 
acceding countries, the average GDP level in 2001 only reaches half the EU-15 average level. The US 
exceeds the EU-15 average level. It should be noted that GDP per person employed does not 
distinguish between full-time and part-time employment.
2 Since the number of people working part-
time is higher in the EU-15 than in the new member states, the differences in GDP per hour worked 
will probably show an even larger gap between member states and acceding countries (see Box 1).
3 
Box 1. Transition to a market economy 
Economically, the main goals for the post-communist countries were internal liberalisation (price reform, 
macroeconomic stabilisation and privatisation) and external liberalisation (removal of non-tariff barriers and 
the removal of state monopoly over foreign trade). The countries adopted different reform packages in order 
to transform their economies. Poland’s ‘big bang strategy’, involving simultaneously removing price controls, 
selling state enterprises to private investors and reforming government finance towards Western models, was 
implemented rather smoothly. An advantage was the already existing private sector, consisting mainly of 
small private agricultural firms: just before the fall of Communism, one-third of the labour force was already 
employed in the private sector. One of the main problems still remaining is the need to restructure the large 
agricultural sector.  
Hungary, on the other hand, took a more gradual approach since the country had already taken some price 
liberalisation measurements during the mid-1980s and continued to implement these, together with privatising 
large state-owned enterprises and reforming state finance. In the beginning of the 1990s, the Hungarian 
government was forced to stop the reforms because of the economic depression but it resumed the thread in 
1995. The private sector is growing slowly and mainly through newly created firms rather than privatisation 
of state-owned companies.  
Just after the fall of Communism, Czechoslovakia split up into the democratic Czech Republic and the Slovak 
Federal Republic. Both started immediately with price and trade liberalisation, and privatisation of state 
enterprises, selling or dividing state property among the population by vouchers during 1992-94. Slovakia 
experienced more difficulties than the Czech Republic in transforming itself into a market economy. The loss 
of Eastern markets hit Slovakia hard because of the structure of its industry. In the Czech Republic, the drastic 
privatisation increased the private sector from practically zero to an estimated three quarters of output in 
1996. Nevertheless, the state still has a majority or holds a stake in a number of large enterprises and banks.  
As the most prosperous part of former Yugoslavia, Slovenia already maintained economic relations with the 
EU. Moreover, the degree of centralisation was lower than elsewhere in Central Europe. At the end of the 
1980s the economic drawbacks of the communist system became visible: high inflation, declining wages and 
increasing debt. Yet, there were restrictions on property rights and the use of capital, there was excessive 
emphasis on heavy industry, large companies played a dominant role and a substantial share of trade was 
directed towards communist countries.  
Estonia was the first Baltic state to have a functioning market economy with a fully privatised public sector 
and a privatised foreign trade system. Latvia and Lithuania still have a rather large agricultural sector in need 
of restructuring. 
                                                                          
2 GDP per hour worked takes this difference into account but is only available for the Slovak and Czech 
Republics. 
3 In the EU-15, on average 13.8% of total employment is part-time. In Hungary, the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia this percentage ranges from 1.9 to 3.2%. Poland’s part-time employment approaches the EU-15 average 
with 11.6% (OECD 2002b, data for 2000). 4 | EDERVEEN & THISSEN 
 
Figure 2. GDP in purchasing power parities (PPP) per person employed relative to EU-15 
(EU-15=100) 
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Notes: EU max = Luxembourg for both years depicted; EU min = Portugal for both years depicted. 
Sources: Eurostat; averages in figures are weighted on the basis of population (OECD, 2001) unless stated otherwise. 
 
The former communist countries were left with low wages and low-wage differentials, partly as a 
result of the central way in which these wages were set. The key aspect of the stabilisation policies 
was the introduction of an income tax. The direct consequence of this tax, however, was a sharp fall in 
real (consumer) wages in 1993, equal to around 80% of their 1989 level in the Czech Republic and 
71% in Poland. After 1993, real wages slowly recovered except in Bulgaria and Romania. In most 
countries, wages lagged behind productivity, though a slow recovery took place in the mid-1990s. 
Slovenia and Estonia were exceptions: in these countries, productivity lagged behind real wages 
during the 1990s (Nesporova, 2002). 
Wages differ per sector. In Poland for instance, wages in public enterprises have remained above those 
in private firms, except in education and financial services. Figure 3 gives an idea of the wages in 
industry and services
4 in euros per year. As we see in Figure  later in the paper, 86% of employed 
people work in these sectors. The (gross) values given in the figure give an idea how low wages still 
are compared with wages in the EU-15. Yet the amounts are not given in purchasing power parities 
that would reduce the gap. As far as detailed data for 2000 are available, earnings are generally lowest 
in hotels and restaurants. Among the member states, Portugal has the lowest level (€8,555); of the 
acceding countries and Bulgaria scores lowest (€908 per year). By contrast, in most countries financial 
intermediation has the highest earnings, with the top figures among the member states being recorded 
in the UK (€57,646) and for the acceding countries in Malta (€22,032) (Eurostat, 2003). 
To further illustrate the differences between EU-15 and ACC-10 wages, the average weighted 
minimum wage in the EU-15 is €962 per month, which would add up to €11,000 to €12,000 per year. 
                                                                          
4 Eurostat provided the data in Figures 3 and 6. Eurostat distinguishes three economic sectors: agriculture, 
industry, and services. Since the first of these sectors includes fishing, but not mining and quarrying, the three 
sectors here are called ‘agriculture, industry and services’ instead of ‘primary, secondary and tertiary sectors’ 
(Eurostat, 2002). CAN LABOUR MARKET INSTITUTIONS EXPLAIN UNEMPLOYMENT RATES? | 5 
 
This is higher than the average annual wage in all new member states, except Cyprus and Malta. 
Differences in purchasing power are not, however, taken into account here. 
Figure 3. Average annual wages in industry and services, 2001 
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Notes: No data are available for Ireland, Italy or Austria; EU-15 average is based on available data and taken from Eurostat 
(2001); the ACC-average is based on own calculations; Lithuania data are from 1999; EU max = Denmark; EU min = 
Greece. 
Source: Eurostat, 2003. 
 
2.3 (Un)employment 
When economies opened to world markets through the introduction of economic measures that also 
allowed rapid price liberalisation, combined with strict macroeconomic-stabilisation policies, the 
result was a steeper than expected decline in the economic performance of these countries. Domestic 
demand fell sharply, first for consumer goods and services and then for investment goods. Subsidies 
for enterprises were cut and productivity had to increase in order to compete with imported products. 
This led to a sharp increase in registered unemployment rates in the beginning of the 1990s. After 
converging, a second upward trend in Poland, Slovakia, Lithuania and Bulgaria, as well as in the 
Czech Republic and Estonia, began around 1998 (Figure 4). Since then, rates have diverged: the 
countries performing the worst (Poland, Slovak Republic, Lithuania and Bulgaria) expose further 
increasing rates while others show stable rates around 7%
5 (Nesporova, 2002). Whereas 
unemployment increased in Poland and the Slovak Republic, it decreased in Hungary and the Czech 
Republic.  
                                                                          
5 Particular groups were worse off, such as the elderly, almost-retired employees, young employees, members of 
ethnic minorities such as the Roma and women. Unemployment rates are still higher for women than for men, 
except in Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania. 6 | EDERVEEN & THISSEN 
 
Figure 4. Unemployment rates 1990-2002 
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Sources: Labour Force Survey, European Training Foundation, UNECE.  
 
The average unemployment rate in ACC-10 in 2003 was higher than the average unemployment rate 
in the EU-15: 14.4% versus 8.0%, respectively (Figure 5a). According to recent research, 78% of the 
acceding countries’ population lives in regions with unemployment rates in excess of 10%, whereas 
the corresponding figure in member states’ regions is 34% (Gacs and Huber, 2003). The rate, 
however, is mainly high because of rising unemployment in Poland and the Slovak Republic in recent 
years. Leaving Poland and Slovakia aside, average unemployment drops below the EU-15 average, to 
7.8%. In five out of ten countries, unemployment is below the EU-15 average.  
Figure 5a. Unemployment rates, 2003  
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Notes: EU max = Spain; EU min = Luxembourg. Unemployment rates represent unemployed persons as a percentage of the 
labour force. Unemployed persons comprise persons aged 15 to 74 who were: a) without work during the reference 
week; b) currently available for work, i.e. were available for paid employment or self-employment before the end of 
the two weeks following the reference week; and c) actively seeking work, (had taken specific steps in the four weeks 
period ending with the reference week to seek paid employment or self-employment) or who found a job to start later, 
i.e. within a period of at most three months. 
Source: Eurostat.  
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Figure 5b. Employment rates, 1998 and 2002  
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Notes: EU max = Denmark; EU min = Italy. Averages are based on data for 2002. The employment rate is calculated by 
dividing the number of persons aged 15 to 64 in employment by the total population of the same age group. The 
survey covers the entire population living in private households and excludes those in collective households such as 
boarding houses, halls of residence and hospitals. The employed population consists of those persons who during the 
reference week did any work for pay or profit for at least one hour, or were not working but had jobs from which they 
were temporarily absent. 
Source: Eurostat.  
The changes in unemployment are not reflected by the same changes in employment, as becomes clear 
when comparing the graphs in Figure 5b. Employment in Poland is lowest of all countries, at a rate of 
51.5%, implying half of the population is not employed. The failure of employment in Poland to 
increase during past periods of high growth, the concentration of unemployment among certain groups 
and persistently high, regional unemployment rates, point to the increasingly structural nature of 
unemployment in Poland (OECD, 2001). Hungary, the country with the lowest unemployment rate 
also has a low employment rate.  
Loss of employment in the formal sector caused the informal sector to grow in the acceding countries, 
especially in the first years of transition. Economic recovery and progress in legislative reform in 
Central Europe have been accompanied by some reduction in informal sector activity. A reason for 
expansion in the informal sector is tax evasion, facilitated by legislative changes lagging behind 
economic developments and by poor law enforcement. A second factor is the large decline in incomes 
experienced by a major share of the population in connection with the transition crisis and rising 
unemployment (Nesporova, 2002). When employment in the informal sector is taken into account, 
unemployment rates are presumably lower than the registered rates.  
Before transition, the defence, oil and gas extraction industries were the major providers of 
employment in the industrial sector, whereas the services sector was underdeveloped. Large state-
owned enterprises dominated all sectors. The private sector was virtually non-existent or played a 
minor role, as was the case in Hungary and Bulgaria. Poland was the one exception: agriculture was 
based on small, private family farms (Nesporova, 1999). In 2001, services rather than industry was the 
dominant employment sector in the acceding countries, as was the case in the EU-15 (Figure 6). The 
agricultural sector is substantially larger in the acceding countries, mainly because of Poland. Were 8 | EDERVEEN & THISSEN 
 
Poland left out, the share of agriculture would decline to 8%. The large agricultural sector in need of 
restructuring bodes ill for future unemployment in Poland and the Baltic States Lithuania and Latvia. 
Figure 6. Employment by sector in acceding countries (left) and in EU member states (right), 2001 
industry
33%
services
54%
agriculture
13%
services
67%
industry
29%
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4%
 
Notes: Percentages are weighted averages for 2001; no data are available for Malta; second-wave countries are not included. 
Source: Eurostat (see footnote 4 for definitions of the sectors). 
Figure 7 shows the shares per country. Indeed, the share of employment in agriculture is still large in 
Poland, Lithuania and Latvia, although it has been declining over the past ten years in all countries 
except in Romania. In Poland and the two Baltic States Lithuania and Latvia, one out of six employed 
people still work in the agricultural sector. In Romania, 43% of the labour force works in the 
agricultural sector.  
Figure 7. Employment per sector (as a percentage of total employment), 2001  
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
P
o
l
a
n
d
H
u
n
g
a
r
y
C
z
e
c
h
 
R
e
p
u
b
l
i
c
S
l
o
v
a
k
 
R
e
p
u
b
l
i
c
S
l
o
v
e
n
i
a
E
s
t
o
n
i
a
L
i
t
h
u
a
n
i
a
L
a
t
v
i
a
C
y
p
r
u
s
B
u
l
g
a
r
i
a
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
E
U
 
m
a
x
E
U
 
m
i
n
U
n
i
t
e
d
 
S
t
a
t
e
s
agriculture industry services
EU-15 agriculture EU-15 industry EU-15 services
ACC agriculture ACC industry ACC services  
Notes: No data are available for Malta; EU max = Greece, Portugal & Luxembourg for agriculture, industry and services, 
respectively; EU min = the UK, Netherlands/Luxembourg and Portugal for agriculture, industry and services, 
respectively. 
Source: UNECE.  
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2.4 Section  conclusions 
•  In the EU-25, 16% of the population will be living in a Central or Eastern -European country, 
together producing only 5% of total GDP.  
•  Productivity in the ten new member states has been rising, but on average, it only reaches 50% of 
the EU-15 level in 2001. As a result, wages are low. 
•  Unemployment in the new member states converged to about 10% in 1996. Since 1998, rates have 
been diverging again: unemployment is high in Poland and the Slovak Republic, but lower than 
the EU-15 average in five out of ten new member states. Excluding Poland and the Slovak 
Republic, unemployment is 7.8% in the new member states, which is just below the average in the 
EU-15 (8.0%).   
•  Poland, Lithuania and Latvia have a high share of agriculture. Since this sector is in need of 
restructuring, this bodes ill for future unemployment. Employment in the industrial sector is higher 
and in the service sector it is lower. 
In the following sections, we focus on the theoretical relationships between labour market institutions 
and labour market performance in the new member states.  
3.  Theoretical impact of labour market institutions on unemployment 
Labour market institutions are often held responsible for poor European labour market performance. In 
this section, we describe the main mechanisms through which institutions can influence the working of 
the labour market. Further, we discuss empirical evidence and assess the effects of labour market 
institutions in the acceding countries. 
A convenient starting point for thinking about the effects of labour market institutions on wages and 
unemployment is provided by a model of wage bargaining. In such a model, wages are bargained over 
by employers and employees. In the bargaining process, employers try to keep wages low to maximise 
their profits, whereas employees try to maximise their real net wage. Both sides have full knowledge 
with respect to the relevant labour market institutions and they use this in trying to obtain an optimal 
outcome from the bargaining process.  
In this document, we will not derive a fully specified mathematical model relating labour market 
institutions to wages and unemployment. One reason for this is that there is no single best model and 
different models lead to different predictions. Another reason is that we don’t want to loose the reader 
in a long mathematical exposition, whereas it suffices for our purpose to sketch the main mechanisms 
through which labour market institutions affect unemployment. To give some flavour of how these 
relations could formally be modelled, we briefly sketch the main features of the so-called ‘right-to-
manage’ framework in the box. The interested reader is referred to Layard, Nickell and Jackman 
(1991) and Pissarides (1990), who describe a number of models that relate institutions to 
unemployment in more detail.  
In the following section, we focus on the labour market institutions that are generally acknowledged to 
have important impacts on labour market performance. These are taxes and social security, the role of 
unions, active labour market policies (ALMP), employment protection legislation and minimum 
wages. In the following sections, we describe the main features of these institutions in the new 
member states of the European Union, compare these to the EU-15 and empirically link them to 
unemployment. Here, we restrict ourselves to the theoretical impact. 
3.1 Social  security 
It almost goes without saying that higher unemployment benefits may increase unemployment. The 
reason is that higher benefits raise the fallback position of the worker, which is the expected income if 
negotiations break down. As a consequence, if the bargaining position of the employee improves, 10 | EDERVEEN & THISSEN 
 
wage demands will be higher and so will unemployment. In a model, as for example in the right-to-
manage framework described in Box 2, this effect is explicitly taken into account in the specification 
of the reservation wage $ W . 
Box 2. Wage formation in the right-to-manage model 
In the right-to-manage framework, wages are determined by negotiations between trade unions and 
employers’ associations. The outcome of the negotiations can be described by the following Nash bargaining 
optimisation: 
α α − Π = Ω 1 U Max
w  
where П and U represent the interests of the employers’ organisation and the trade unions respectively. The 
parameter α represents the relative bargaining power of the employers' organisation. In particular, if α = 1, 
bargaining is completely dominated by the employers, whereas α = 0 indicates complete domination by the 
union. Negotiating partners maximise the bargaining outcome with respect to the contractual wage rate W. 
Employment is determined unilaterally by the labour demand of employers. 
The employer aims to maximise profits П, i.e. 
WL PY − = Π  
where P and Y denote the price and the volume of value added and L stands for employment. According to 
this equation, lower wages are in the interest of firms since they increase profits.  
The utility-function of the trade union reads as follows: 
[ ]
η η −
− − =
1 ˆ ) 1 ( W t W L U a  
Hence, trade unions care about both wage incomes and employment among their members. The parameter η 
represents the value that unions attach to employment, relative to wages. If η = 1, unions do not care about the 
wage level, whereas η = 0 indicates that they are only interested in the wage rate. In all other cases, trade 
unions face a dilemma between wages and employment. On the one hand, unions act in the best interest of its 
members and aim at setting wages high. On the other hand, they take into account that higher wages have a 
negative impact on the demand for labour by employers. The utility that trade unions derive from higher 
wages is defined relative to the so-called ‘fallback’ position for workers, or reservation wage $ W . This 
reservation wage is the expected income for a worker in case the wage negotiations break down and the 
worker loses his or her job. 
Optimising the Nash bargain with respect to the wage rate and the relationship between labour demand and 
wages, we arrive at the following expression for wages: 
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where χ1= α+η(1-α)/(1+ε-1); χ2= (1-α)(1-η); ε the price elasticity of demand. 
This expression shows that wages are determined as a weighted average of the reservation wage and labour 
productivity with the weights depending on the parameters of the bargaining process. It further reveals that 
real wages increase if the relative bargaining power of the trade unions increases (i.e. lower α) or if trade 
unions care more about wages relative to employment (i.e. lower η). Moreover, a higher replacement rate, i.e. 
an increase in unemployment benefits B relative to wages, raises wage demands through the reservation 
wage $ W . Apart from these institutional parameters, real wages are negatively related to the unemployment 
rate according to the wage curve. 
The importance of this effect is determined by the level of the benefits relative to the wage level. This 
ratio is measured by the replacement rate. So, according to the theory, the higher the replacement rate, 
the higher unemployment will be. CAN LABOUR MARKET INSTITUTIONS EXPLAIN UNEMPLOYMENT RATES? | 11 
 
Another important feature of the social security system is the duration of unemployment benefits. The 
longer the duration of the eligibility for unemployment benefits, the stronger the effect of the 
replacement rate on unemployment will be. Empirical evidence suggests that long-term benefits 
generate long-term unemployment (see for example Nickell and Layard, 1999). 
A third related aspect of the unemployment benefit is the strictness of eligibility. In the model in the 
Box 2, it is simply assumed that workers are eligible for benefits when they become unemployed. In 
practice, this is often not the case. We will come back to this when describing the institutions in the 
new member states. Available empirical research shows that the severity of the benefit system may be 
an important determinant of unemployment duration (see for example, Abbring et al., 1999 and the 
Danish Ministry of Finance, 1999).  
3.2  Active labour market policy 
Active labour market policy can take various forms. It involves both the creation of jobs for certain 
groups of unemployed people in the public sector and it includes wage-cost subsidies for specific 
forms of employment in the private sector. Regardless of the specific form, active labour market 
policy in itself will have a positive effect on employment. Yet, it has to be paid for as well. One also 
has to be careful in assessing the effects of job creation in the public sector, as it leads to a reduction in 
employment in the private sector because vacancies there become more difficult to fill. Dahlberg and 
Forslund (1999), for example, reach the conclusion for Sweden that the ultimate net employment 
effect of the active labour market policy is 35% of the number of jobs created. For the Netherlands, 
Jongen et al. (2003) find a net employment effect of between 31% and 48% of the number of jobs 
created in the public sector.  
One way of modelling active labour market policies is by assuming that unemployed persons receive a 
subsidy when they find work and that taxes are raised by the same amount to pay for this subsidy. 
Receiving a subsidy is only one of the many programmes active labour market policies cover. The 
wide variety of programmes and the various effects that may be important are hard to model in one 
model. Some schemes have been modelled by Pissarides (1990) in the context of the matching 
process. Quite apart from their effect on matching efficiency, active labour market policies may affect 
the productivity of jobseekers. This is the aim of labour market training as well as of various work 
experience programmes. Calmfors et al. (2002) provide a summary of the theoretical discussion on the 
expected effects and draw some lessons from the Swedish experience. 
3.3 Taxes 
In addition to the social security benefits system, taxes also play a role in the redistribution of income. 
If taxes are progressive, then people with a high income will pay proportionately more tax than people 
with a low income. As a consequence, wage demands are moderated because they are less valuable, 
leading to lower unemployment. In the right-to-manage framework in Box 2, this effect can be seen 
through the way the marginal tax rate tm and the average tax rate ta enter the model. Nevertheless, a 
probably more important effect of fiscal progression is that it has negative consequences for labour 
supply. It reduces the incentives for people to work harder because free time becomes more attractive 
than consumption. Both the empirical work of Newell and Symons (1993) and the simulation results 
for the Netherlands (Graafland et al., 2001) conclude that higher progression in the end leads to less 
employment. 
Next to the progressiveness of the system, the tax wedge itself is also an important determinant of 
wages and unemployment. Intuitively, a higher tax wedge raises the relative attractiveness of working 
in the informal sector. These activities are not taxed because they simply are not subject to taxation 
(such as household production), or because taxes are evaded (black market activities).  
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In the bargaining model, this implies a better fallback position, thereby strengthening the bargaining 
position of the union in the formal sector. Phelps (1994) and Pissarides (1998) model these effects 
formally. Furthermore, just as with progressive taxes, a higher tax wedge can discourage labour supply 
and result in less employment. 
3.4  The role of unions 
In a bargaining model, an important determinant of real wages (and unemployment) is the relative 
bargaining power of the employee or trade union relative to the employer (or employer’s association). 
The bargaining position of trade unions depends first of all on the number of people that unions 
represent. The higher the union density, the better the relative bargaining position of the trade unions 
is.  
The institutional level at which negotiations take place is another factor that influences the outcome of 
the bargaining process. We can distinguish between three levels of wage bargaining: firm or plant 
level (decentralised bargaining), industry level (bargaining at the intermediate level) and countrywide 
level (centralised bargaining). In many countries, informal networks and intensive contacts between 
social partners also coordinate the behaviour of trade unions and employers’ associations. Examples 
are the leading role of a limited number of key wage settlements in Germany and the active role of 
powerful employer networks in Japan (Soskice, 1990). Therefore, not only does the formal degree of 
centralisation matter, but also the degree of informal consensus-seeking among bargaining partners. 
This is generally called the level of coordination. For highly centralised bargaining systems, the degree 
of coordination and centralisation are likely to coincide. More decentralised systems may, however, 
exhibit higher degrees of coordination than the formal level of centralisation suggests. 
Different views exist on how these different levels of wage bargaining affect the labour market. First, 
the neo-liberal school argues that the more decentralised and the less coordinated the bargaining 
process, the less bargaining power trade unions can exert. Second, the corporatist school argues that 
centralised or coordinated bargaining results in the lowest real wage demands, because centralised 
wage-setters are more aware of the negative externalities associated with high wages. The third view 
combines both arguments into a hump-shaped relationship with the highest real wages at the 
intermediate industry level, while wage levels are lower at both the decentralised and the centralised 
level (Calmfors and Driffill, 1988). The arguments underlying the hump-shaped hypothesis are based 
on a closed economy. In an open economy, consumption prices are also affected by imports while 
producer prices are determined on international markets. It has therefore been argued that real wage 
levels are more or less independent of the bargaining structure in open economies (Danthine and Hunt, 
1994).  
3.5  Employment protection legislation 
We now turn to the theoretical effects of job security regulations and laws concerning the use of fixed 
contracts. Strict dismissal protection makes it more difficult and more expensive for businesses to lay 
off staff. This reduces the number of dismissals and can thus lead to a fall in unemployment. 
Furthermore, it encourages employers and employees to invest in company-specific knowledge and 
skills. On the other hand, it also makes employers more cautious in taking on new staff, which makes 
it more difficult for the unemployed to find work. Lengthening the average duration of unemployment 
may exacerbate the depreciation of knowledge and skills on the part of jobseekers. Dismissal 
protection is therefore attractive for those who have a job, but unfavourable for jobseekers. This will 
tend to reduce short-term unemployment and raise long-term unemployment. The ultimate effect on 
total unemployment is, however, ambiguous (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999).  
There are different ways of including employment protection into a model of wage bargaining. An 
example is provided by Belot (2003), who models the effects of firing costs by assuming that in each 
period a certain proportion of the workers is fired and that firms incur a fixed cost per fired worker. 
She shows that fewer dismissals, associated with stricter employment protection, weaken the CAN LABOUR MARKET INSTITUTIONS EXPLAIN UNEMPLOYMENT RATES? | 13 
 
bargaining position of the unions and therefore pull the wage down. Another possible extension allows 
for a severance pay. Suppose for instance that when firms want to fire one of their employees, they 
have to pay him or him a severance pay. Utility of employees improves with the transferred amount, 
but the firms’ profits will accordingly be lower. If we assume that severance pay is higher when 
employment protection is stricter, we can conclude from the model that employment protection 
legislation has two opposite effects: on the one hand, wage demands will be higher, because the 
fallback position of employees improves as they earn a premium when they get fired. On the other 
hand, employers incur higher costs and therefore are not prepared to pay the same wage as when 
employment protection legislation is lacking. The model does not provide a decisive answer about the 
ultimate effect on real wages.  
Empirical research into the effect of employment protection on the labour market also fails to reveal 
any uniform effects. Boeri and Jimeno-Serrano (2003) discuss eleven studies, only three of which 
report a significant negative impact on employment and two a significant positive impact on 
unemployment. Most of the studies reach insignificant or ambiguous conclusions. Employment 
protection does appear relevant for the dynamics of the labour market: according to virtually all 
available empirical studies it leads to fewer dismissals and lower recruitment. Although the level of 
unemployment does not appear to change significantly on balance, employment protection does lead 
to a significant increase in the length of unemployment and thus widens the gap between those in work 
and the unemployed. 
3.6 Minimum  wages 
The theoretical effects of minimum wages on employment are well-established. According to standard 
economic theory, a minimum wage leads to a reduction in employment. Employers find it too 
expensive to continue employing low-skilled workers at a wage that is higher than their productivity. 
This may explain why unemployment among the low-skilled is higher than among skilled workers. 
Despite this theoretical prediction, empirical literature from the US suggests that the minimum wage 
has little effect on employment levels. Time-series analyses show that an increase in the minimum 
wage of 10% leads on average to a fall in employment among teenagers of 1-3%, i.e. a fall in total 
employment of between 0.1% and 0.3% (Brown et al., 1982). Cross-sectional studies show even 
smaller effects (Card and Krueger, 1995).   
The fact that American empirical research finds that changing the minimum wage has virtually no 
effect on employment may be related to its low level there: even if the minimum wage were increased 
by several percentage points, it would still be low. The same applies to the UK – Dickens and 
Manning (2002) conclude that the impact of the minimum wage is limited because it has been set at a 
level such that only 6-7% of workers are directly affected. It may therefore be that the minimum wage 
has a greater effect in continental Europe. Empirical estimates for the Netherlands by van Opstal 
(1990) do indeed suggest greater employment effects in the 1980s. A study by Kertesi and Köllö 
(2003) discusses the effects of the recent increase of the minimum wage in Hungary in 2001 by no less 
than 57%. Their conclusions unambiguously point at a loss of employment opportunities. The effect 
was strongest in small firms. All in all, if minimum wages are set at such a level that a significant 
portion of the labour force is affected, they seem to lead to higher unemployment. 
4.  Rigidity of labour market institutions in the new EU member states 
The combination of labour market institutions determines the rigidity of labour markets. The EU-15 
countries are known to have more rigid labour markets than the US. This is thought to be a reason 
behind lower labour market performance. This section addresses labour market institutions in the new 
member states in order to give an indication of where they can be ranked in terms of rigidity. The first 
part of this section focuses on social security systems. The second part will address the process of 
wage-formation in the acceding countries during the last 15 years. The third part examines regulation 
of the labour market in terms of minimum wages and employment protection legislation. 14 | EDERVEEN & THISSEN 
 
4.1 Social  security 
This section will look more closely at the social security systems in the new member states, including:  
•  level of replacement rates, eligibility for unemployment benefits and duration of the benefits; 
•  tax wedge; and 
•  expenditure on active labour market policies.  
4.1.1 Replacement  rates 
At the outset of the transition there was no unemployment in the new member states. The emergence 
of high rates of unemployment was not generally regarded by policy-makers as a serious threat and 
most of the new Eastern European governments introduced fairly generous unemployment benefits (in 
terms of eligibility, levels and duration). In the beginning of the 1990s, however, unemployment rose 
sharply and so did the claims on benefits. Many countries reacted after 1991 by making eligibility 
rules more restrictive, shortening the duration of entitlement and cutting unemployment benefits 
(Scarpetta and Reutersward, 1994). Replacement rates give an indication of the level of benefits the 
unemployed person receives relative to average wages of the employed. Obviously, the tightening of 
the unemployment benefit system at the start of the 1990s resulted in declining replacement rates.  
The OECD provides gross replacement rates for the earnings level of an average production worker 
(APW). These data are currently only available for Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia. Figure 8. gives the replacement rate for the first five years of unemployment. Whereas the 
replacement rates in the first year of unemployment are comparable to those in EU members such as 
Ireland and Greece, in the years that follow replacement rates in the new member states drop 
drastically: only in Hungary do the unemployed receive benefits after being unemployed for more than 
one year. In comparison, replacement rates in the EU-15 are 25% in the second to third year and 16% 
in the fourth to fifth year of unemployment. The replacement rates reach a maximum of 50% in the 
first year and an overall average of 4% over five years and four countries. These levels make it rather 
unlikely that unemployment benefits per se would discourage benefit recipients from taking up a job. 
Figure 8. Gross replacement rates for APW over a five-year period, 1999  
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The increase in unemployment did not only give rise to a decline in replacement rates, eligibility for 
unemployment benefits became stricter and the period of time for receiving benefits was reduced. In 
Table 4.1, features of the unemployment benefit systems are summarised.   
In most new member states, people registered as being unemployed receive an unemployment benefit 
if they have worked from up to 12 months. In Bulgaria, Latvia and Cyprus these periods are shorter; in 
Slovakia and Lithuania people are required to have an employment history dating back at least 24 
months. More recent laws tend to require longer periods of previous employment (avoiding claims 
after seasonal employment for instance). This is longer than in the EU-15: in Greece and the 
Netherlands, only half a year suffices; in Spain benefit conditions only require 12 months of 
employment over six years. 
 
Table 2. Main characteristics of the unemployment benefit system  
 
 
Replacement rate 
average benefit as % 
of APW, 1
st year 
 
Eligibility/required 
employment history 
Benefit as % of 
previous earning for a 
single person 
Duration of benefit 
  % months  % months 
Poland 
 
29  12 in 18  no relation (work 
history) 
6-18 (living area) 
Hungary  50  12 in 48  65  3-12 (work history) 
Czech Republic  22  12 in 36  50% first 3 months, 
40% next 3 months 
6 
Slovak Republic  40  24 in 36  50% first 3 months,  
45% thereafter 
6-9 (contribution 
length) 
Slovenia  -  12 in 18  70% first 3 months,  
60% thereafter  
3-24 (contribution 
length, age) 
Estonia  -  12 in 24  no relation 
 
6-12 (contribution 
length) 
Latvia 
 
-  9 in 12  50-65% 1-3 months, 
30-49% (3-9)  
9 
Lithuania 
 
-  24 in 36  no relation (reason job 
loss, insurance)  
6 
Cyprus -  6  60%  - 
Malta  -  -  no relation (work 
history) 
 
Bulgaria  -  9 in last 15  60%  4-12 (work  history)   
Romania 
 
-  12 in last 24  50-55% (contribution 
length)   
6 (work history) 
Denmark 73  12  in  36  90%  60 
The Netherlands  89   6 in 9 (flat rate) 
48 in 60 
no relation (70%MW) 
70% 
6 
6-60 
Germany 70  12  in  36  60%  12 
Greece  44   about 6 in 14   40%   12 
United Kingdom  49  24  no relation  6 
Sources:  column 1: OECD (1999); column 2: Burger (OECD, 2002a for CZ and PL; IMF, 2001 for LV; European 
Commission, 2001a-b, 2002a-b, 2003a for BG, CY, EE, LT and RO; GVG, 2003 for EE, HU, MT and SK; Min. of 
Labour for SI); column 3: Burger (ibid); UNECE (2003) for LT and RO; column 4: Burger (ibid) and UNECE 
(2003) (ISSA); Cazes (2002) for HU; data for member states: OECD (2002); columns 2 and 3 of the Netherlands: 
www.socialezekerheid.nl. 
The initial benefit is about half of previous earnings. This rate remains fixed in some countries and 
gradually declines in others. In Poland, Lithuania and Malta there is no relationship between the 
amount received and previous earnings. In Poland and Malta, however, the length of the employment 
history determines the height of the (flat) rate.  16 | EDERVEEN & THISSEN 
 
In Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, Estonia, Bulgaria and Romania, duration depends on the length of 
employment history or the period during which contributions to the unemployment benefit fund were 
made (or both). Other factors can be age (Slovenia), reason for job loss (Lithuania) or unemployment 
rate in the area in which the claimant lives (Poland). People with a limited employment record receive 
benefits for only three to four months in Hungary, Slovenia and Bulgaria.   
The payment rate (column 3) can be up to 90% within the EU-15 (Denmark and Finland), but the 
lowest rates (40% in Greece and 60-65% in France & Portugal) are comparable to rates in new EU 
member states. Liberal countries have flat rates. Duration is clearly longer in the EU-15: Belgium has 
unlimited duration, while in Italy and the UK unemployment benefits are granted for six months. 
Again, we see major variations within both categories of countries. Benefit systems in Greece and 
Portugal (not shown), but also in Germany and the UK, resemble those in the acceding countries most.    
Elderly people who lose their job are eligible for early-retirement schemes in most acceding countries, 
depending on age, employment history and reason for job loss. Poland introduced this possibility by 
law in 1981, a year in which the Polish economy suffered a major decline. Since the mid-1960s, 
disability pensions had been the main form of retiring before reaching the pensionable age. Early 
retirement became the main instrument to ward off unemployment among employees with long work 
records, for instance in state enterprises (Golinowska, 1993). The level of payment is higher than 
unemployment benefit: 120 to 160% of the basic benefit. By mid-2000, 12% of the registered 
unemployed received early-retirement payments (European Commission, 2001d). The Slovak 
Republic and Malta have no early retirement system. In some countries, such as the Czech Republic, 
disability benefits provide a more generous alternative than social allowances, particularly for older 
workers, and are therefore used as an alternative to early retirement, as in Malta (Burger, 2003). 
Table 3. Unemployment rate and the share of unemployed receiving benefits     
2002, Q2  Unemployment rate  Share of unemployed receiving 
benefits 
Poland 17.4  19.0 
Hungary 8.1  33.5 
Czech Republic  8.7  33.8 
Slovakia 17.6  17.1 
Slovenia 11.3  24.3 
Estonia   7.0  49.6 
Lithuania 10.7  10.7 
Latvia 7.9  44.3 
    
Bulgaria 17.2  20.2 
Romania 9.6  23.3 
Source: UNECE (2002, Q2). 
On average, eligibility is stricter (the employment history must be longer), duration is shorter and 
replacement rates are lower in the new member states. Strict eligibility and short duration led to high 
percentages of unemployed not entitled to unemployment benefits (Table 3). Comparing the second 
and third column in Table 3 (unemployment rate and the share of those receiving benefits, 
respectively), an interesting observation can be made: countries with high unemployment levels 
(Poland, Slovakia and Bulgaria) have low coverage compared with countries where unemployment is 
lower (Hungary, Czech Republic, Estonia and Latvia) (UNECE, 2003). The share of unemployed 
receiving benefits is low: about half of total unemployment lasts longer than 12 months, which would 
give a share of about 50% of unemployed receiving benefits. Conditions concerning the length of 
previous employment are stricter in Poland and the Slovak Republic than in Hungary and the Czech CAN LABOUR MARKET INSTITUTIONS EXPLAIN UNEMPLOYMENT RATES? | 17 
 
Republic, which could account for a lower share of those receiving benefits. Multiplying both columns 
results in values around 3% (except in Lithuania), indicating that an equal percentage of the labour 
force receives unemployment benefit in each country. Note that, as for other social security benefits, 
means-tested social assistance schemes exist in all acceding countries.
6 
4.1.2  Active labour market policy 
Along with passive labour market policies (unemployment benefits, social assistance), governments 
can also choose to adopt a package of active labour market policies. These include for instance, 
temporary job programmes (especially practised in the public sector in Poland, Czech Republic, 
Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania and Bulgaria), recruitment subsidies (popular in Poland, Hungary, 
Slovenia, Latvia and Bulgaria) and (re)training. (Re)training is adopted in most countries (but hardly 
at all in Bulgaria and the Slovak Republic). As in the EU-15, a shift from passive to active labour 
market policies can be observed during recent years. Nevertheless, expenditure on active labour 
market policies is still rather low compared with what is spent by the EU-15. Only Hungary exceeds 
the level of spending in Greece, the EU-member spending the least (Figure 9). 
Figure 9. Expenditure on active labour market policies as a percentage of GDP, 2000 
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Sources: OECD (1998) for EU & CZ, PL and SR; others: European Commission, 2001a-d, 2002a-b and 2003a.  
As for effectiveness, it has been found that active labour market policies reduce the length of 
unemployment in the Czech Republic. In Poland it was found that the employment rate for people who 
had had training was higher. In Latvia, the number of people finding a job after participating in a 
programme rose from 25% in 1997 to over 50% in 2000. Temporary job schemes in Bulgaria on the 
other hand seemed to function more as income support than as activation measures (EBRD, 2000).  
                                                                          
6 Besides cash payments, social assistance can be composed of health insurance and free access to social services 
(Poland, Lithuania) or a heating allowance in winter (Romania, Lithuania). Beneficiaries are mainly persons who 
are no longer entitled to unemployment benefits or were never eligible (for instance because of the lack of an 
employment history or voluntary leave). Where the amount of unemployment benefit is lower than the 
subsistence minimum, as can be the case in Slovakia and Estonia where the benefit is calculated on a household 
basis, an individual is entitled to seek social assistance.  18 | EDERVEEN & THISSEN 
 
Even though reported results point to the positive effects of active labour market policies on 
employment, spending on such programmes is low. Increasing spending may enable a faster return of 
unemployed persons to the labour market. Shorter unemployment duration by guided re-entering of 
the unemployed into the labour market will affect labour-market dynamics positively.  
4.1.3 Tax  wedge 
Part of employees’ motivation to work comes from the consumption they can finance out of the 
income they earn. Income taxes and the employees’ social security contributions reduce the return 
from working and therefore influence the decision to (re-)enter the labour market or choose leisure or 
unpaid employment (e.g. childcare). Payroll taxes, such as employer’s social security contributions, 
raise the costs of employing labour over the wage paid. Higher wages increase unemployment (OECD, 
1994).  
Table 4. Tax wedge, 1999 
Poland 42.9 
Hungary 52.6 
Czech Republic  43.0 
Slovak Republic  42.0 
Slovenia 41.0 
Estonia 40.0 
Lithuania 39.7 
Latvia 41.7 
Cyprus 16.5 
Malta 16.4 
EU min (Ireland)  25.8 
EU max (Belgium)  55.6 
EU-15 weighted average  43.2 
Sources: OECD (PL, HU, CZ, SK and BE, and IRE), Eurostat (other countries, for low-earners); tax wedge is the employees’ 
and employers’ social security contributions and personal income tax, less transfer payments as a percentage of gross 
labour costs. 
Table 4 shows the tax wedge, defined as employees’ and employers’ social security contributions and 
personal income tax, less the transfer payments as a percentage of gross labour costs. Although high 
taxes on labour are often perceived as one of the causes of high unemployment in, for instance Poland 
(European Commission, 2004), the wedge in the new member states is not higher than the average 
wedge in the EU-15. Hungary is the only country with a tax wedge above the EU-15 average. The 
high tax wedge in Hungary could form an obstacle for entrants to the labour market. This may be an 
explanation for the low employment rate in this country. A high tax wedge makes working in the 
informal sector more attractive. Moreover, high taxes on labour can be detrimental to job creation.  
4.2 Wage  formation 
As discussed in the previous section, wage-bargaining structures affect employment. In addition to the 
level at which bargaining takes place, three other factors influencing bargaining power are discussed 
in the following paragraphs: union density, coverage and coordination. 
4.2.1  Unions: Density, coverage and coordination  
In most EU-15 countries, unions still play a major role in the process of wage bargaining. Union 
density may be low in some countries (Germany, France and Spain), union coverage (i.e. the number 
of workers, unionised or not, who have their pay and working conditions determined by collective CAN LABOUR MARKET INSTITUTIONS EXPLAIN UNEMPLOYMENT RATES? | 19 
 
agreements in the enterprise sector) remains high. Collective agreements cover over 70% of the labour 
force in all countries except the UK and reach well over 90% in some countries (Finland, Germany, 
France and Austria). The UK is also the country with the lowest level of coordination, whereas in 
other countries informal consensus-seeking among bargaining partners is quite common. In Germany, 
the wage rate is set in one industry before bargaining officially starts and this rate is usually followed 
by other sectors.  
A high level of coordination is likely to coincide with highly centralised bargaining systems, whereas 
decentralised systems may exhibit higher degrees of coordination than expected. The latter can be 
observed within the EU-15: during the past few years, a decentralising trend towards bargaining at the 
industry level has taken place, while coordination remains on a high level and has even been 
increasing (except in Sweden and the UK).  
The new member states present a more homogeneous picture of unionisation, centralisation and 
coordination (Table 5). In these countries density has also declined, but more importantly for 
bargaining power, union coverage is about the same as in the EU-15. In Slovenia, membership of the 
bargaining organisation is compulsory, implying complete coverage (European Commission, 2003b). 
Significant differences have emerged between the public and the private sectors, with much lower 
unionisation of workers in the latter. Workers in medium-sized and small firms are rarely unionised 
(Nesporova, 2002). Although coverage is about as high as in the EU-15, bargaining power of the 
union depends heavily on coordination ability (informal consultation between unions and employers’ 
organisation and/or at the inter-industrial level), which is now actually rather low in most of the 
acceding countries. In Estonia, the level of coordination between employers is very low: only one 
(voluntary) employers’ association exists, covering 200,000 out of 640,000 employees. Declining 
bargaining power can also be low owing to other factors – in Poland the existence of many small 
unions erodes the union’s power: next to two large unions, about 300 nationwide unions and 24,000 
local unions exist (World Bank, 2002b). 
Table 5. Union bargaining power: Density, coverage and coordination 
 Density  Coverage  Coordination 
Poland 34  70-100  1.5 
Hungary 60  70-100  1.5 
Czech Republic  43  26-69  1 
Slovak Republic  62  70-100  2 
Slovenia 60  70-100  3 
Estonia 36  26-69  1.5 
Sweden
7 91  89  2 
Germany 26  92  3 
France 10  95  2 
Italy 39  82  3 
United Kingdom  34  47  1 
United States  16  18  - 
Notes: Coordination is given in indices ranging from 1 (low coordination) to 3 (high coordination). 
Sources: EU member states – OECD (1997, 1994); new member states – Cazes (2002) and Riboud (2002), late 1990s. 
                                                                          
7 Until 1995, a national law required compulsory membership of a trade union in Sweden.  20 | EDERVEEN & THISSEN 
 
4.2.2  Collective wage bargaining  
Before the transition commenced, the state controlled the wage bargaining process. Most people were 
employed by large state-owned industrial companies. Wages did not reflect productivity or 
performance. After transition, all Central and Eastern European countries started to move away from 
the centralised bargaining system and efforts were made to develop a collective bargaining system at 
the firm level. In practice, although basic guidelines are sometimes established through tripartite 
negotiations with the government, most wage bargaining takes place at the industry or the firm level, 
and in the private sector employers set wages. Next to collective bargaining focussing on guidelines 
for working conditions (Poland, the Slovak Republic and Estonia), the government does play a major 
role in setting minimum wages in some countries. In Poland, unions can exert influence on wage 
policy in the public sector.  
Slovenia and Hungary are the main exceptions as far as centralisation is concerned. In Hungary, 
centralised collective bargaining has never been important. Wage deregulation had already begun 
before transition and during the privatisation period most private sector wages became freely 
negotiable at the industry and firm level. Some form of collective bargaining is still binding (only in 
the public sector), which is regulated through a strict wage-tariff system. In Slovenia, bargaining does 
take place on the centralised level. Consultations occur first at the national level, resulting in a 
collective agreement for the private sector that establishes base wages and adjustment factors for 26 
industries and 9 education levels and a collective agreement for the non-market sector. Both 
agreements constitute the basis for all other contracts, therefore limiting wage variation across 
industries and firms. Multi-level bargaining takes place only in Slovenia and to a lesser extent in 
Hungary and Latvia (European Commission, 2003b). 
Overall, two developments can be observed: a widening gap between sectors and a widening gap 
between state-owned and private (mostly small) firms. Unions mostly exert influence in large, not yet 
privatised firms. Workers in new firms in the expanding service sector on the other hand are rarely 
represented by a union. The emergence of small private firms (outside agriculture, 90% of newly 
created firms in Poland have less than 5 employees) weakens trade union power in Poland. Collective 
agreements can be adopted only when a union is present. Therefore, wages in the private sector tend to 
be lower than those in the public sector, although foreign firms form an exception to this rule (World 
Bank, 2002b). Although coverage is high, coordination still lags behind in the new member states, 
resulting in lower bargaining power than in the EU-15. 
4.3  Labour market regulation 
Collective centralised bargaining results in the setting of a minimum wage and working conditions in 
some acceding countries. The minimum wage is one of the regulations the government can enforce in 
order to ensure a minimum standard of living. Furthermore, the government can regulate the labour 
market by enforcing laws regarding protection of employees’ health and safety in their working 
environment and protection against sudden dismissal. This section will look into: 
•  the level of the minimum wage; and 
•  the degree of employment protection in the acceding countries.  
4.3.1  Minimum wage  
The level of the minimum wage relative to the average wage and unemployment benefit determines its 
effect on (un)employment. If the minimum wage and the unemployment benefit are very low 
compared with average wage levels, its effect on unemployment is expected to be small. A recent 
paper on Hungary’s policy of doubling the minimum wage between 2001 and 2002 finds that 
employment was reduced in the small-firm sector (Kertesi & Köllö, 2003).  
Figure 10. provides an overview of the level of minimum wages in the new member states relative to 
the average-wage level. All countries have a legally binding minimum wage, although in Cyprus it is CAN LABOUR MARKET INSTITUTIONS EXPLAIN UNEMPLOYMENT RATES? | 21 
 
only for specific professions.
8 The variation in ratios of minimum to average wage is about the same in 
the EU-15 and the ACC-10: Malta has the highest ratio, even by far exceeding the EU-15 country with 
the highest ratio, France. The minimum wage was introduced at the start of the transition at ratios to 
average wage that are similar to those in the member states of the EU (45-50%). Slovenia only 
introduced a minimum wage in 1995. As nominal wages remained unchanged in spite of inflation, the 
ratios fell. Until the mid-1990s, the increase in real wages remained below the growth of productivity, 
except in Slovenia and Estonia, where real-wage growth had outpaced productivity growth in the 
beginning of the decade. The level of minimum wages has been adjusted numerously in many 
countries during the 1990s: Poland increased its minimum wage significantly in 1993, Hungary 
doubled it and  
Figure 10. Minimum wage as percentage of average wage, 2002 
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Notes: EU max = France; EU min = Spain. Romania more than tripled it in the beginning of this century. Still, the number of 
people receiving the minimum wage is low in most countries: 3-5%. This could be related to the low level of the 
minimum wage, in most countries, well below the subsistence minimum (Nesporova, 2002). It is therefore unlikely 
that the minimum wage has a negative effect on unemployment in these countries. 
Sources: UNECE, 2002; CY: Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance (minimum wage only valid for clerks, salespersons, 
nurses, school-assistants, kindergarten attendants, no minimum wage for other occupations); MT: JAP, 2001 
(relative to average net wages).  
 
Malta forms an exception: the gap between the minimum wage and unemployment benefit is relatively 
small – €8 per week for a household with three children. This is one of the elements of the social 
security system Malta aims to reform.  
4.3.2  Employment protection legislation (EPL) 
Before transition, employees in the centrally planned economies of the acceding countries enjoyed a 
fairly high degree of employment protection. Over the 1990s, the need for rapid structural adjustment 
of the transition economies after the introduction of economic and social reforms resulted in 
substantial moderation of EPL, partly enabled by weakening of trade union power. The objective was 
to facilitate workforce adjustment for firms in order to make enterprises more flexible and 
                                                                          
8 In Cyprus, only clerks, salespersons, nurses, and school and kindergarten staff are entitled to a minimum wage. 22 | EDERVEEN & THISSEN 
 
competitive. During the 1990s, legislation on employment protection has been revised several times, 
resulting in re-tightening of employment protection in some countries and its further moderation in 
others (Cazes, 2002). 
Figure 11. Strictness of employment protection legislation on a scale of 0-6 (6 = the most strict), 
late 1990s  
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Notes:  Employment protection legislation is given for three categories: legislation concerning regular employment, 
temporary employment and collective dismissals. The averages are taken from an index averaging the three 
categories. 
Sources: World Bank (2002a) and Riboud (2002).  
 
Figure 11 shows employment protection legislation concerning regular employment, temporary 
employment and collective dismissals. It turns out collective dismissals in particular are difficult to 
achieve in the new member states. With respect to regular employment, Hungary and Poland enforce 
the least strict laws. In Hungary, a written statement to the employee suffices for dismissal. In both 
countries, job redundancy or unsatisfactory performance suffices for dismissal, the notice period is 
short and the severance pay is small. The Czech Republic and Hungary have the least employment 
protection regarding temporary employment (renewal and maximum duration of contract). Hungary 
does have high employment protection where collective dismissals are concerned; in Slovenia 
employees are least protected when large groups of people are fired at the same time (Riboud et al., 
2002; Nesporova and Cazes, 2003). 
Labour markets known to be flexible (the UK, the US and Ireland) have less strict employment 
protection than the new member states.
9 Southern European countries have the most strict employment 
protection laws, protecting their employees at about the same level as in Slovenia, the country scoring 
highest among the new member states shown. Denmark, Switzerland and the UK have the least strict 
legislation on employment protection. Hungary has least restrictive laws of the acceding member 
states, but these are still considerably stricter than in the US.  
                                                                          
9 Boeri (2002) suggests that employment protection is an alternative form of insurance against labour market 
risks. He shows a trade-off between employment protection (particularly relevant in Mediterranean countries) 
and social security (mainly relevant in corporatist and social-democratic countries). CAN LABOUR MARKET INSTITUTIONS EXPLAIN UNEMPLOYMENT RATES? | 23 
 
4.4 Section  conclusions 
Labour markets in the new member states seem to be less rigid than in the EU-15, given that:  
•  Replacement rates are lower and duration is shorter – after one year of unemployment no 
unemployment benefit is issued anymore in most countries. 
•  In the wage-setting process, coordination is lower in the new member states; in general, bargaining 
takes place at the firm level. 
•  Employment protection legislation is less strict – only collective dismissal legislation is stricter in 
the new member states than in most EU-15 countries. 
•  Minimum wages as a percentage of average wages are lower in the new member states. 
Only expenditure on active labour market policies is considerably lower than in the EU-15. The tax 
wedge is high only in Hungary, but about the same in the other three countries. 
Figure 12, representing the rigidity of labour markets in the new member states compared with the 
EU-15 labour markets and the US labour market, confirms our analysis. 
Figure 12. Flexibility of labour markets 
 
Employment Protection Legislation
Tax Wedge
Coordination RR 1st year
Union density
US
EU-15
ACC
 
Notes: RR 1
st year = replacement rate in the first year of receiving unemployment benefit; ACC represents non-
weighted averages over the six major new member states; for tax wedge and RR, only the four largest 
new member states are included. 
Source: Authors’ illustrations based on this section.  
 
In short, labour market institutions in the new member states on average do not differ that much 
anymore from the institutions in the EU-15. If anything, they should be considered more flexible. 
Thus, labour market institutions imply less rigid labour markets in new member states than in the EU-
15. This suggests that labour market performance should not lag behind in the new member states.  
The next section empirically examines the effects of labour market institutions on unemployment.  
5.  The quantitative effect of labour market institutions on unemployment  
Quantifying the relationship between unemployment and labour market institutions has been the topic 
of several studies. In their overview Nickell and Layard (1999) conclude that the main institutions 
influencing unemployment are unions and social security systems.  
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To reduce unemployment, governments should encourage product/market competition to eliminate the 
negative effect of unions, and link reforms of unemployment benefit systems to active labour market 
policies in order to move people from welfare to work. The following overview is based on a number 
of cross-country studies that we discuss in more detail below. 
5.1  Overview of existing studies 
Econometric analyses of the impact of institutions can be divided into two different types. First, there 
are studies that focus on ‘shocks’ and their interaction with institutions, which are assumed to be 
constant over time. The best example of this line of work is probably Blanchard and Wolfers (2000). 
On the basis of a panel of institutions and shocks for 20 OECD nations since 1960, they conclude that 
the interaction between shocks and institutions is crucial to explaining both the rise in European 
unemployment and the differences among countries. The shocks they consider consist of TFP growth, 
the real interest rate, the change in inflation and shifts in labour demand. These variables drive 
unemployment, so that, for example, the fact that annual TFP growth was considerably higher in the 
1960s than in the 1990s in most countries is an important reason why unemployment was typically 
higher in the latter period. The effects of the labour market institutions that they estimate confirm the 
theoretical predictions described in section 3: the effect of an adverse shock on unemployment is 
increased by higher replacement rates, longer benefit duration, a higher tax wedge, less ALMP, more 
union density and coverage, and less coordination. Also, more employment protection is found to 
strengthen the effect of adverse shocks. The basic Blanchard and Wolfers model is extended in a 
number of papers, e.g. Bertola et al. (2001) and Lopez-Garcia (2003). 
A second type of econometric study relies on changing institutions to explain unemployment patterns. 
Here, a subdivision can be made of studies that use averages over institutions for different periods to 
explain the long-term unemployment trends and studies that use annual data to explain actual 
unemployment. A good example of the latter is provided by Nickell et al. (2003). They include shocks 
in money supply, labour demand, total factor productivity and prices and interest rates to explain the 
short-term deviations of unemployment from its equilibrium level as determined by the institutional 
structure. Their model is capable of explaining more than half of the individual country changes in 
unemployment. Their results are in accordance with theoretical predictions: a higher replacement rate, 
longer benefit duration, a higher employment tax rate, more union density and less coordination 
significantly increase unemployment. Stricter employment protection also seems to raise 
unemployment.  
The other type of study that relates changing institutions to unemployment is static in the sense that it 
does not aim at explaining the exact annual level of unemployment, but rather the underlying 
structural trend. This kind of study therefore does not rely on the measurement of shocks. Belot and 
van Ours (2004) provide a notable example of this line of reasoning. They provide econometric 
estimates of the impact of labour market institutions on unemployment on the basis of a panel of 17 
OECD countries for the period 1960-99. The only variable they include to account for deviations from 
the natural non-accelerating level is the change in inflation. Their basic regression results, without 
allowing for fixed effects, show a significant effect of the replacement rate, taxes, employment 
protection, union density and centralisation on unemployment. All variables, except employment 
protection legislation, have the expected sign. Yet in contrast with the results from Blanchard and 
Wolfers (2000) and Nickell et al. (2003), Belot and van Ours find that stricter employment protection 
legislation lowers unemployment. This does not necessarily oppose theoretical predictions, as theory is 
ambiguous about the direction of the effect. When country and time-period fixed effects are 
introduced, most institutions do not significantly influence unemployment anymore. Belot and van 
Ours argue that it is the effect of the complete institutional framework that matters. To investigate this 
hypothesis, they extend their analysis to allow for interactions between institutions. These interactions 
indeed significantly affect the unemployment rate. This happens at the expense of the direct effects of 
some of the institutions considered. CAN LABOUR MARKET INSTITUTIONS EXPLAIN UNEMPLOYMENT RATES? | 25 
 
Two broad lessons can be drawn from the existing body of empirical work on the impact of 
institutions on unemployment: i) institutions matter and a substantial part of the fluctuation in 
unemployment can be explained by changes in the institutional structure; and ii) theoretical 
predictions about the way institutions influence unemployment are confirmed by the econometric 
results. These empirical studies invariably use a selection of about 20 highly developed OECD 
countries. It is not at all certain that the explanatory power of labour market institutions for 
unemployment is the same for countries in a different phase of development. In the next section, we 
try to extend the existing empirical work to understand whether labour market institutions can explain 
the variation in unemployment figures of the acceding countries. 
5.2  Empirical results for the new member states  
We use the recent study of Belot and van Ours (2004) as a basis for our analysis. This is a convenient 
starting point for at least two reasons. First, it uses data for the period 1960-99, whereas most other 
empirical studies use a sample dating up until 1995. For our purpose, using such recent years in the 
empirical analysis is essential, as unemployment in the acceding countries only stabilised at around 
1995. At that time, markets had adapted somewhat to the new circumstances. Second, Belot and van 
Ours assess the structural impact of the institutional framework on unemployment, rather than the 
interaction of shocks and institutions or the explanation of actual unemployment. This fits nicely with 
the objective of our study: we want to understand whether unemployment in the acceding countries 
can be explained by the way labour market institutions are built.  
Belot and van Ours kindly provided us with the data they used. These include the tax wedge, 
replacement rate, employment protection, union density and centralisation as well as data for 
unemployment and employment for 17 OECD countries.
10 We were able to extend the sample with the 
four largest new member states (Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and the Slovak Republic).
11 In 
order to include these countries, we use different indicators for both the tax wedge and for 
employment protection legislation. In addition, following the discussion in the previous sections, we 
constructed series for the replacement rate in the first year and the duration of unemployment benefits, 
for statutory minimum wages (as a percentage of average wages) and for active labour market policy 
(normalised on the unemployment rate percentage). A detailed description of sources and 
computations can be found in the Data Appendix at the end of this document.  
5.2.1 Results 
Table 6 presents the results of our regressions for the unbalanced panel of 21 countries. The empirical 
results are based on five-year averages; the maximum number of observations is therefore a total of 
eight periods covering five years each (during the period 1960-99) multiplied by 21 countries = 168 
observations. Nevertheless, as we have only data for the last five-year period for the four accession 
countries, it is reduced to 140. All the regressions include dummies for the time periods included to 
account for cyclical variation. Furthermore, following Nickell and Layard (1999) and Belot and van 
Ours (2004), we include the change in inflation in our regressions in a modest attempt to control for 
some of the deviations from the structural unemployment rate. 
The first column in Table 6 shows the estimation results of our benchmark specification.
12 The results 
imply that the unemployment rate is positively influenced by taxes and by benefit duration. 
                                                                          
10 These are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US. 
11 Including other acceding countries severely restricts the number of labour market institutions we could include 
in the regressions. 
12 We have also experimented with interactions between institutions. In contrast to Belot and van Ours (2004), 
these interaction terms turned out to be insignificant in our regressions and we therefore decided not to show 
these here. 26 | EDERVEEN & THISSEN 
 
Surprisingly, the first-year replacement rate has a negative impact. Stricter employment protection and 
more coordination also significantly lower unemployment. 
Table 6. Regression results explaining the unemployment rate in 21 countries 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Tax wedge  0.142**  0.194**  0.039 
Replacement rate, first year -0.024*  0.011 0.074** 
Benefit duration  0.014**  0.006  -0.013 
Employment protection legislation  -0.027**  -0.017  -0.000 
Union density  0.019  0.039**  0.099** 
Coordination -0.012**  -0.011*  -0.011** 
ALMP   -0.133**  -0.136** 
Minimum wage      0.144** 
Change in Inflation  -0.503**  -0.652*  -0.537 
      
Adjusted R2  0.57  0.48  0.63 
Total number of observations  140  72  44 
Period 1960-99  1980-99  1980-99 
Time dummies?  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Notes:  ** indicates 5% significance-levels, * indicates 10% significance levels; significance is based on White 
heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. 
Below, we discuss the interpretation of the coefficients in more detail. The tax wedge has a major 
effect on unemployment: a 1 percentage point higher tax wedge raises unemployment by 0.14%. 
Regarding the unemployment benefit system, instead of using one summary variable, we try to 
disentangle the effects of the level of benefits and the duration of entitlement. According to our 
estimations the first-year replacement rate has an unorthodox negative albeit small effect on 
unemployment, whereas a higher duration of entitlement does significantly increase unemployment. 
We would expect both variables to exert upward pressure on unemployment, as has been found by 
Nickell et al. (2003). A possible explanation is that the tax wedge and the replacement rate are 
correlated. Nickell et al. (2003) do not include the latter variable.  
Theory is ambiguous about the effects of employment protection legislation on unemployment. Our 
results imply that stricter employment protection significantly lowers unemployment. This supports 
the findings of Belot and van Ours, but contradicts the results of a number of other studies. An 
implication is that a rigid labour market is not necessarily bad for employment. As the EPL-variable 
ranges from zero to one, the maximum effect of stricter regulations is 2.7%. 
Turning to wage formation, we included union density and coordination as independent variables. The 
bargaining power of trade unions improves with more members, so we expect higher union density to 
lead to higher wage demands at the expense of higher unemployment. The estimated coefficient is 
indeed positive, albeit small and statistically insignificant. Coordination of wage bargaining leads to 
lower unemployment: under fully coordinated bargaining unemployment is 2% lower than under fully 
uncoordinated bargaining. Our results thus support the corporatist view of wage bargaining. This 
result is in line with most other empirical studies. Finally, the change in inflation appears significantly 
negative in the regressions. This is in accordance with theoretical predictions. 
Two elements of the discussion of labour market institutions in previous sections are still missing in 
the regressions presented so far. These are active labour market policies and minimum wages. Data on 
both variables are only available from the 1980s onward, so when including these we have to drop half 
of the observations. The second column in Table 6 shows the regression results when we extend the 
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per unemployed person. The regressions are run for the period 1980-99 and include 72 observations. 
The results show that active labour market policies significantly affect unemployment: when more 
money is targeted on the unemployed in the form of one of the various programmes covered under the 
heading ALMP, unemployment decreases. This extension does have some effects on the other 
estimated coefficients. The impact of the replacement rate now turns positive, as expected, although 
the effect is not significant. The estimated impact of both benefit duration and employment protection 
also loses significance, but keep the expected sign. In contrast, the estimated impact of union density 
becomes significant: a 10% increase in union membership raises unemployment by 0.4%. 
Including minimum wages poses some more problems. In a number of countries no statutory 
minimum wage exists, but industry- or occupation-specific minimums are set by legislation or 
collective bargaining agreements. It is possible to include the summary estimates constructed by 
Dolado et al. (1996) for these countries, as has been done in some other empirical studies (e.g. 
Neumark and Wascher, 2003). We don’t follow this practice here, because i) this series has not been 
updated and ii) the Dolado series does not use the same denominator as the OECD series. In the 
present study we restrict our empirical analysis to the countries for which statutory minimum wages 
exist.
13 The results are presented in the last column of Table 6 and use 44 observations from the period 
1980-99. In line with theoretical predictions, minimum wages (measured as a percentage of median 
wages) significantly raise unemployment. The estimated coefficient implies that increasing the 
minimum wage relative to the median wage by 1% results in 1.4% more unemployment. This addition 
also has implications for some of the other estimated coefficients. Most striking is that the tax wedge 
is no longer significant, but that the estimated effect of the replacement rate becomes highly 
significant and much larger than in the other regression results. This may be because of the fact that 
replacement rates and tax wedges are highly correlated. It may therefore be hard to disentangle both 
effects. The coefficient on union density is also influenced by adding the minimum wage variable to 
the regression: it becomes much more important than in the earlier results. 
In conclusion, the empirical results seem to provide support for the theoretical predictions on the 
influence of labour market institutions on unemployment. The effects are, however, sensitive to the 
specification of the regression, the sample period used and the countries considered. These results 
therefore should not be interpreted as exact estimates of the effects of labour market institutions on 
unemployment, but they provide an idea of the importance of different factors. 
5.3  Implications for unemployment in the new member states  
To what extent does the design of labour market institutions in the new member states provide an 
explanation for the level of unemployment rates in these countries? This is the central question of this 
paper. In the previous section we have seen that labour market institutions are in general no more rigid 
in the new member states than in the EU-15. Nevertheless, a lot of heterogeneity exists among the 
acceding countries. In this section we use our empirical results to assess whether this heterogeneity 
can explain the huge variation in unemployment rates for the four acceding countries that we included 
in the regressions. As our exact estimation results in the previous section were quite sensitive to the 
specification of the regression equation and did not explain more than 60% of the variation, we do not 
expect to be able to fully explain these differences in unemployment rates. Our results, however, are in 
line with theoretical predictions and with other empirical work. So, if labour market institutions are the 
major determinant of unemployment in the new member states, the regression results should certainly 
explain a substantial part of the variation. 
                                                                          
13 These are Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the UK, the US, 
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Table 7. Implied unemployment rates in the new member states 
 Actual  UR 
(1995-99) 
Implied UR (1)  Implied UR (2)  Implied UR (3)  Actual ER 
(1995-99) 
Poland  11.5% 10.7% 12.1% 11.2% 58.4% 
Hungary  8.5%  11.1% 13.0% 12.4% 53.0% 
Czech Republic  7.5%  10.1% 11.1% 8.0%  69.1% 
Slovak  Republic  13.7% 8.1%  10.3% 11.5% 59.5% 
 
The first column of Table 7 shows the average unemployment rates over the period 1995-99 in these 
countries: ranging from 7.5% in the Czech Republic to no less than 13.7% in the Slovak Republic. The 
proceeding columns confront these values with the unemployment rates that are implied by the results 
of the regression in Table 7 The second column shows the results of our computations when we apply 
the estimated coefficients from the first regression (covering 1960-99 without ALMP or minimum 
wages) to the labour market institutions in the acceding countries.  
In contrast to reality, the implied unemployment rate turns out to be lowest for the Slovak Republic. 
There are two reasons for this result: the tax wedge is a bit lower in the Slovak Republic than in the 
other acceding countries and wage formation is relatively coordinated. According to the regression 
results, both aspects have a downward effect on unemployment. The big difference with actual 
unemployment seems to suggest that other factors besides labour market institutions also play a role in 
the Slovak Republic. 
The highest implied unemployment rate is found for Hungary. This also seems completely at odds 
with the data: the official unemployment figure for Hungary is quite low. At first sight, it thus seems 
that these results sketch an overly pessimistic picture of the Hungarian case. A more detailed inquiry 
into the Hungarian figures reveals that the modest unemployment rate is accompanied by extremely 
low employment. The last column of Table 7 shows the employment rates for the acceding countries. 
Average employment over the period 1995-99 was only 53%, lower than in any other country 
considered. From these data it seems that much hidden unemployment exists in Hungary. The 
declining unemployment rates in the 1990s were not matched by increasing employment levels. 
Unemployed people do not register anymore since Hungary toughened the unemployment benefit 
eligibility criteria or they have found a job in the underground economy. In any case, labour market 
institutions might be more of a burden than actual unemployment figures seem to suggest. The tax 
wedge in particular is extremely high at 51.5%. 
The third column shows the implied results from the second regression, where we included 
expenditure on active labour market policies. The implied unemployment rates increase in all new 
member states, reflecting the relatively low spending on ALMP. The order between the four acceding 
countries does not change: the implication of labour market institutions alone would be that 
unemployment in the Slovak Republic is lower than in the three other countries. 
In the fourth column we use the results of the final regression (with minimum wages) for our 
computations. This has a major impact on the results. Implied unemployment is now lowest in the 
Czech Republic, in accordance with reality. The reason behind this result is twofold. First, minimum 
wages are low in the Czech Republic. Second, in the regression result replacement rates have gained 
importance at the expense of the tax wedge. Because the replacement rate is very low in the Czech 
Republic, this implies a lower unemployment rate of only 8.0%. In fact, this is close to the actual 
figure of 7.5% over the period 1995-99.  
The implications for Hungary remain as before: implied unemployment is high. As explained before, 
we think that this reflects the actual situation on the labour market. Reducing the tax wedge and the 
replacement rate, along with re-evaluating the recent minimum wage increase would probably be 
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Implied unemployment for the Slovak Republic increases considerably to 11.5%. This is still well 
below actual unemployment. Furthermore, as described in section 2, unemployment has further 
increased in recent years to 19% in 2002. Data on labour market institutions alone are not capable of 
explaining this development.  
This holds even more strongly for Poland. Although there is only a modest difference between implied 
and actual unemployment, institutions fail to explain the enormous increase in unemployment in 
recent years. Unemployment in Poland rose from 11% in 1997 to almost 20% in 2002. Clearly, other 
factors play a role in explaining this disastrous development.  
From the results in this section we can conclude that labour market institutions can only account 
partially for the performance of the labour market, and that other aspects are important as well. In the 
next section we will list some other potential reasons behind the recent rise in unemployment rates in 
Poland and the Slovak Republic. 
6.  Other causes of unemployment  
Our descriptive assessment of labour market institutions suggests unemployment should not be higher 
in the new member states than in the EU-15. Our empirical results draw the same conclusion: labour 
market institutions explain only a minor part of unemployment in the new member states, let alone the 
diverging trend since 1998. Since then, unemployment has been rising in Poland and the Slovak 
Republic, whereas in Hungary and the Czech Republic unemployment remained stable. These 
developments suggest that other factors are responsible for unemployment. 
This section aims at giving some explanations for the increase in unemployment in Poland and 
Slovakia. Luckily, these countries are exceptions: none of the other new member states face 
comparably high unemployment rates. Lithuania comes nearest with 12.7%. 
6.1  Other institutional factors 
The difference in foreign direct investment the acceding countries attracted during 1990-2000, was 
large: Hungary and the Czech Republic received more than twice the per capita amount Poland and the 
Slovak Republic received. FDI increases the number of jobs created temporarily. Lower FDI can 
therefore affect unemployment in an indirect manner. One of the factors determining the level of FDI 
attracted is a country’s political and economic stability (Nesporova, 2002). FDI is not the only factor 
that is negatively influenced by weak governance. 
A recent report on the Slovakian business environment states that the business community perceives 
the weak legal environment as a major problem (PAS, 2002). Complaints concern the instability and 
ambiguity of legislation, poor and slow enforcement of law (including the registration of enterprises) 
and corruption. According to public perception surveys, corrupt practices are widespread at the 
interface of the public and private sectors. Small-scale entrepreneurs suffer from inadequate protection 
of property rights. Smaller businesses are more vulnerable to the infringement of their property rights 
and to exploitation by unscrupulous officials and organised crime. Moreover, the administrative 
barriers to business creation and entry are still unnecessary high. Illicit payments reportedly take place 
to quicken the registration process. After 2002, the new government announced reforms, making the 
taxation and regulatory frameworks more supportive of new enterprise creation and business 
development. They stated it was necessary to enhance ‘cultural’ changes in law- and rule-enforcement 
so as to make the formal regulatory framework fully reliable (OECD, 2004).  
Table 8 shows three World Bank Governance Indicators related to the legal, political and business 
environment in the four largest new member states: government effectiveness, regulatory quality and 
rule of law. Government effectiveness measures the quality of public service provision, the quality of 
the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political 
pressures and the credibility of the government’s commitment to policies. Regulatory quality is more 
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such as price controls or inadequate bank supervision, as well as perceptions of the burdens imposed 
by excessive regulation in areas such as foreign trade and business development. Under rule of law 
several indicators are included that measure the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide 
by the rules of society. These include perceptions of the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and 
predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts. Rule of law measures the success of 
a society in developing an environment in which fair and predictable rules form the basis for economic 
and social interactions, and importantly, the extent to which property rights are protected (Kaufmann 
et al., 2003). 
Poland and especially the Slovak Republic score lower than Hungary and the Czech Republic on all 
indicators. Slovakia scores lower than all other new member states on all indicators, except Poland on 
regulatory quality. Particularly government effectiveness and rule of law are particularly low in 
Slovakia, implying lack of credibility of the government, low quality of civil servants and public 
service provision and poor judiciary power. Poland scores lowest on regulatory quality, implying 
market-unfriendly policies and excessive regulation in business development – measures that are 
detrimental to job creation.  
Table 8. Governance idicators, 2002 
 Government 
effectiveness 
Regulatory quality  Rule of law 
Poland 0.61  0.67  0.65 
Hungary 0.78  1.21  0.90 
Czech Republic  0.70  1.12  0.74 
Slovak Republic  0.40  0.76  0.40 
Note: The indicators range from -2.5 (low) to 2.5. 
Source: Kaufmann et al. (World Bank) (2003).  
 
Introducing the rule of law into our regressions from the previous section gives us an indication how 
this indicator affects unemployment. A drawback of these data is that they are only available from 
1996. In our regressions, we use the average rule of law score for 1996-99 to proxy for the quality of 
these institutions over the whole period considered. We expect that countries with a less well-
developed institutional framework show higher unemployment rates. The estimated coefficient indeed 
supports our prior expectations: a higher score on rule of law indicator has a dampening effect on 
unemployment. The results with respect to the other variables are hardly affected by the introduction 
of this indicator. 
6.2  Postponed structural reforms and strict monetary policy 
The Governance Indicators shown above have improved in recent years in both Poland and the Slovak 
Republic. Therefore they cannot explain the marked increases in unemployment rates in Poland and 
the Slovak Republic in recent years. These increases can be partly attributed to (postponed) 
restructuring. Below, we’ll explore this and other causes for unemployment rises in Poland and the 
Slovak Republic. 
At the outset of transition, Poland was fast in the liberalisation of prices, currency devaluation and 
macroeconomic austerity measures, but was slow in privatisation and structural reforms of certain 
sectors (agriculture, coal mining and steel). This created structural problems. A tight monetary policy 
and acceleration of structural changes were enforced after 1998 to tackle economic imbalances. The 
combination of a strict monetary policy and major social reforms with many initial problems resulted 
in escalating unemployment (Nesporova, 2002). 
Also in 1998, following elections that put an end to a period of dirigisme and international isolation, 
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and large-scale industrial restructuring. The restructuring caused a significant improvement of trend 
productivity growth. Yet the growth process was not able to redirect those losing their jobs in 
transition restructurings into productive use, reflecting both insufficient demand for and weak 
effective supply of labour in the lower segment of the market. Unemployment increased, mainly 
among low-skilled workers. Indeed, Slovakia has the highest unemployment rate for the low-skilled: 
39% in 2001 (OECD, 2004). In both countries, at the same time that restructuring started, inflation 
rose.  
Poland reduced its inflation rate by 10%: from 12% in 1998 to 2% in 2002. Structural reforms in 
combination with tight monetary policy may have been a cause of the 10% increase in Polish 
unemployment in the same period: from 10 to 20%.  
In the Slovak Republic, disinflation objectives were pursued without an excessive tightening of 
monetary conditions.
14 During 1998-2002, inflation declined by almost 4% to a level of 3%. In the 
same period, unemployment rose by about 6% to a level of 17%. 
It is generally known that a trade-off between inflation and unemployment rates exists. Mankiw 
estimates the sacrifice ratio (the trade-off between GDP and inflation) at 5%, implying a 1% decline 
in inflation costs 5% GDP. Together with Okun’s law, stating that 1% unemployment coincides with a 
3% loss in GDP (Hall and Taylor) this implies that reducing inflation by 1 percentage point requires 
about 1.67 percentage points of cyclical unemployment. Although the trade-offs above seem to be less 
distinct, they may play a role in explaining increasing unemployment rates. Especially in Poland, 
where restructuring was implemented at a time monetary policy when was tightened, this trade-off 
may provide an explanation for rising unemployment.  
Notably, restructuring implies the shifting of employees between sectors. The people losing their jobs 
as a consequence may not be suitable for vacant jobs, for instance because they are low-skilled. As a 
result, they remain unemployed.  
The Polish agricultural sector still employs as much as 19% of the labour force. Other countries have 
been faster in restructuring their agricultural sectors: in Hungary, the Czech Republic and the Slovak 
Republic, only about 6% of the labour force is employed in the agricultural sector (see Table 9). 
Agriculture in Poland probably is to some extent a refuge sector: poor job opportunities and low 
unemployment benefits prompt people to make a living cultivating kitchen gardens or small family 
holdings. The professional status of the persons employed confirms the idea of a refuge sector: over 
90% of the people employed in this sector are family workers or self-employed without employees 
(Eurostat, 2002). Poland faces increasing future unemployment, as reforming this rather large sector 
will force its employees to shift to other sectors. Restructuring already caused approximately 200,000 
people to lose their jobs during 1998-2000. Finding a new job in a different sector is not easy: in the 
same period, 200,000 jobs were lost in the service sector and about 440,000 jobs disappeared in the 
industrial sector (especially in mining and manufacturing). Privatisation deals, particularly in Poland, 
included temporary bans on mass redundancies. The expiry of such privatisation clauses after 1998 
was one reason for the rapidly increasing unemployment in this country (Nesporova, 2002). Since the 
restructuring of loss-making state sectors (steel, defence and railways) is an ongoing process, major 
job loss is caused in these sectors, specifically hitting unskilled and low-skilled workers. Moving these 
employees from these old to new sectors (for instance services) is difficult in the current institutional 
and regulatory environment remaining detrimental to job creation (OECD, 2001, EIRO, 2003).  
                                                                          
14 Disinflation has been helped by currency appreciation and international price moderation, but the key to 
successful disinflation thus far has been the ability of the Central Bank to contain second-round effects of 
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Table 9. Share of employment in agriculture over time 
  Share of employment in 
agriculture (%) 
1994 
Share of employment in 
agriculture (%) 
2002 
Poland 23.8  19.3 
Hungary 9.0  6.3 
Czech Republic  6.9  4.8 
Slovak Republic  10.2  6.2 
Source: OECD. 
 
To estimate the role of a large agricultural sector in labour market performance, we introduced this 
indicator in our regression. Our conjecture is that a country with relatively more agricultural activity 
compared with the size of this sector in neighbouring countries is assumed to be in the process of 
transforming and catching up. A higher share of agriculture therefore goes hand in hand with a higher 
unemployment rate. Our hypothesis is confirmed: a higher share of agriculture raises unemployment. 
In particular, 1 percentage point extra employment in agriculture causes an extra 0.1 percentage point 
of unemployment. The results with respect to the other variables are hardly affected by the 
introduction of this indicator. 
The Slovak Republic has another sector to worry about: Slovakia’s share of general government 
employment is one of the highest within post-transitional OECD countries (21%).
15 There is an 
obvious need for a smaller and more effective government. Restructuring the general government will 
probably cause more unemployment.  
Moreover, unemployment among low-skilled workers is high. In other OECD countries many low-
skilled workers are successfully employed in private services as salaried employees or are self-
employed, while these types of activities remain underdeveloped in Slovakia. Slovakia’s inability to 
generate jobs for marginal workers has not improved in the recent period. Almost a quarter of a 
million low-skilled jobs requiring no more than primary or incomplete secondary schooling 
disappeared during 1994-2002 and their share in total employment plummeted from 20 to 8% (OECD, 
2004). 
6.3  Increasing labour force: Youth unemployment  
Finally, demographic changes contributed to increasing unemployment. During 1987-2002, the 
population in both Poland and the Slovak Republic has been growing modestly (with 2.5% and 2.9%, 
respectively), whereas population has been declining in Hungary and the Czech Republic (with 4.4% 
and 1.5%, respectively). Demographic changes affect labour supply: during 1998-2000, the Polish 
labour force increased significantly as a result of large groups of young school-leavers entering the 
labour market. This is in line with Figure13 below, showing the major increase in youth 
unemployment in Poland and the Slovak Republic in 2001 compared with 1998.  
                                                                          
15 The share of government does well exceed Germany (11%), Ireland (12%), the US (15%), Spain (14.5%), 
Italy (16%), Portugal (18%) and Belgium (18%), but lies under the share in Scandinavian countries (30%) and 
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Figure 13. Unemployment per age group, 1998 (left) and 2001(right) 
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Source: OECD Unemployment Outlook (2002), Statistical Annex. 
In addition to the high youth unemployment rate in Slovakia, the proportion of those aged 15 to 19 
who are in neither the education nor the labour force is also the highest in the OECD, at 25%(OECD, 
2004) 
Most reasons for high unemployment growth during the past few years in Poland and the Slovak 
Republic are of a temporary nature. This suggests high unemployment is cyclical. Ongoing 
restructuring in combination with tight monetary policy, along with educational or sectoral mismatch 
between labour demand and labour supply caused unemployment rates to increase fast. Weak 
governance is not behind rising unemployment but could continue to depress the labour market 
situation at length. 
Although temporary, some of the causes of unemployment mentioned in this section (e.g. job loss, the 
shifting of employees to other sectors because of restructuring and an increasing labour force) could 
acquire a permanent character if no new jobs are created and these persons remain unemployed for a 
considerable length of time. Low-skilled and youth unemployment could turn out to be a permanent 
problem in Slovakia unless education is promoted, whereas Poland faces increasing unemployment 
when the agricultural sector is reformed and already faces high youth unemployment. 
7. Conclusions 
The enlargement of the European Union with ten new member states represents a large change. Some 
15 years ago, most of the new member states were still led by a communist government. Workers 
enjoyed a high degree of employment protection and pay systems were fairly rigid. Many people in 
the EU-15 therefore worried about the possible consequences of the new situation. Although labour 
markets in the EU-15 are often blamed for their inflexibility, which acts as an impediment to 
economic development, the rigid systems in the former communist countries would certainly be no 
better, so the story goes. High unemployment in Poland supports this idea. The envisaged rigidity of 
the Central and Eastern European labour markets therefore seems to justify fears about labour market 
problems in the enlarged European Union.  
Nevertheless, much has happened in the new member states in the past decade. Since the beginning of 
the transition, the social security systems have been revised drastically: replacement rates are now 
comparable to those within the EU-15, but benefit duration is markedly shorter in acceding countries. 
Employment protection has been liberalised and minimum wages have been introduced. The collective 
agreements, as bargained over at the decentralised industrial or firm level, now cover the majority of 
employees in the new member states. It is only expenditure on active labour market policies that still 
remains low. In short, labour market institutions in the new member states do not on average differ 
that much anymore from the institutions in the EU-15. If anything, they should be considered more 
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Common knowledge suggests that unemployment in the new member states is much higher than in the 
EU-15. Yet five out of the ten new member countries show unemployment rates below the weighted 
average in the EU-15. This does not mean that there are no labour market problems in the new 
member states. Just as in the EU-15, a great deal of heterogeneity exists among the acceding countries. 
In some of them, labour market reforms could prove a key issue in improving employment 
performance. The most notable example is Hungary, where a high tax wedge poses severe problems.  
The main worry with respect to labour market performance is presented by Poland and the Slovak 
Republic, representing more than half of the population in the new member states. Unemployment 
rates have risen dramatically in these two countries in recent years, reaching levels of almost 20%. Our 
research clearly shows that labour market institutions are not capable of explaining this development. 
Other factors must be behind these rising unemployment rates. 
Three factors seem to play a key role in explaining recent unemployment growth in Poland and the 
Slovak Republic. The most important factor appears to be postponed structural reforms. Both 
countries went through key liberalisation reforms in recent years, while tightening monetary policy at 
the same time. This has put an upward pressure on unemployment. A second factor is the weak quality 
of the rule of law in both countries. As a consequence, they attracted less FDI than other acceding 
countries. Third, demographic changes played a role.  
Most of the reasons for high unemployment growth during the past years in Poland and the Slovak 
Republic are of a temporary nature. This suggests high unemployment is cyclical. Some of the 
reasons, however (e.g. job loss, the shifting of employees to other sectors as a result of restructuring 
and an increasing labour force), could acquire a permanent character if no new jobs are created and 
unemployed people remain jobless for a considerable length of time.  
Do labour market institutions cause high unemployment in the new member states? Our answer is no. 
The new member states with the highest unemployment rates do not feature overly rigid labour 
markets. The reasons behind their malfunctioning labour markets are related to other factors. Labour 
market institutions in the new member states are comparable to those in the EU-15 and can only 
account for a small part of the problems in Poland and the Slovak Republic. Nevertheless, just as in 
the EU-15, labour market reforms may be needed in a number of accession countries in order to 
further improve economic performance. | 35 
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Data Appendix 
The regressions in section 5 use data for a sample of 21 countries over the period 1960-99. 
This appendix describes the data and the sources from which they were obtained in more detail. 
Countries 
We include 21 countries in our regressions. These are the four largest new member states (Poland, the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and the Slovak Republic) and the 17 countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the UK and the US) that Belot and van Ours (2004) include in their regressions. 
Henceforth we will refer to Belot and van Ours (2004) as BvO. 
Unemployment rate 
The unemployment rate is taken from the OECD for the years 1960-2000. We use the standardised 
unemployment rate as obtained from the Main Economic Indicators (MEI).  
Tax wedge 
For 1960-79 we rely on the tax rate series constructed by BvO. This tax rate is calculated as the sum of 
the employment tax rate and the direct tax rate. A more detailed description of their calculations can 
be found in the data appendix accompanying their publication. 
Because we were unable to extend this series to the new member states, we decided to use a different 
indicator for the period 1979-2000. For this period we use the tax wedge as obtained from the OECD. 
The series we use refers to a single average production worker and can be found in table 3/6 in the 
annex to the OECD-publication Taxing Wages 2000-2001. The total tax wedge is defined there as 
“employees’ and employers’ social security contributions and personal income tax less transfer 
payments as percentage of gross labour costs”. 
Replacement rate first year 
The OECD has collected systematic data on the unemployment benefit replacement ratio for three 
different family types (single, with dependent spouse, with spouse at work) in three different duration 
categories (first year, second and third years, fourth and fifth years) from 1961 to 2001 (every other 
year). From this, we calculated a summary measure for the replacement rate in the first-year by taking 
a simple average over the first year replacement rates for the three family types. The replacement rate 
used by BvO is computed by taking the mean for all nine categories. 
Unemployment benefit duration 
We follow Nickell (2003) in calculating a measure of the unemployment benefit duration. He starts 
from the OECD data described in the previous paragraph and computes the indicator by normalising 
the level of benefit in the later years of the spell on the benefit in the first year 
of the spell. The exact formula reads as follows: [0.6 (2nd and 3rd year replacement ratio) + 0.4 (4th 
and 5th year replacement ratio)] ÷ (1st year replacement ratio).  
Employment protection legislation 
For the 17 countries for which BvO have data available, we use the index they constructed. This series 
measures the strictness of employment regulation with respect to open-ended contracts, fixed-term 
contracts and temporary work agencies. See BvO for further details. 
For the four new member states we use data constructed by Nicoletti et al. (2000). We normalised 
these to the same range as the series from BvO. 
Union density 
We obtained the union density series from BvO. The original source is the OECD Labour Market 
Statistics.  
Centralisation 
Index (1-3) characterising the degree of centralisation of the bargaining system, with higher numbers 
indicating more centralisation: 1 = firm level, 2 = industry level and 3 = national level. Source: BvO. 
Coordination 
Index (1-3) characterising the degree of coordination of the bargaining system, with 3 being the most 
coordinated. Source: BvO. 
Active labour market policies 
Expenditure on active labour market policies as a percentage of GDP is obtained from the OECD 
Labour Market Statistics. Following Nickell et al. (2002), we normalised the series by dividing it by 
the unemployment rate. 
Statutory minimum wage (as percentage of the average wage) 
Source: OECD Labour Market Statistics. 
Change in inflation 
To measure the change in inflation we start from the consumer price index (CPI) as obtained from the 
series ‘CPI all items’ from the OECD. This is an index series, with the value for 1995 normalised at 
100. For the four new member states this series is available from 1995 at the latest. For the other 17 
countries, this series is available from 1960, with the exception of Denmark, for which the series start 
at 1968. For Denmark we therefore use a different series, the consumer price index from the 
Luxembourg Income Studies, for the first two five-year periods. We obtained this series from BvO, 
who use it for all countries for the whole sample period.  
Inflation in year t is calculated as:  1 1 / ) ( − − − = t t t t CPI CPI CPI INF . 
Finally, the change in inflation in year t is defined as:  1 − − = t t t INF INF CHI . ABOUT ENEPRI 
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